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This paper develops a probabilistic analysis of conditionals which hinges on a
quantitative measure of evidential support. In order to spell out the interpreta-
tion of ‘if’ suggested, we will compare it with two more familiar interpretations,
the suppositional interpretation and the strict interpretation, within a formal
framework which rests on fairly uncontroversial assumptions. As it will emerge,
each of the three interpretations considered exhibits specific logical features that
deserve separate consideration.
1 Preliminaries
Although it is widely agreed that indicative conditionals as they are used in or-
dinary language do not behave as material conditionals, there is little agreement
on the nature and the extent of such deviation. Different theories of condition-
als tend to privilege different intuitions, and there is no obvious way to tell
which of them is the correct theory. At least two non-material readings of ‘if’
deserve attention. One is the suppositional interpretation, according to which
a conditional is acceptable when it is likely that its consequent holds on the
supposition that its antecedent holds. The other is the strict interpretation,
according to which a conditional is acceptable when its antecedent necessitates
its consequent. This paper explores a third non-material reading of ‘if’ — the
evidential interpretation — which rests on the idea that a conditional is accept-
able when its antecedent supports its consequent, that is, when its antecedent
provides a reason for accepting its consequent.
The first two interpretations have been widely discussed, and have prompted
quite distinct formal accounts of conditionals. The suppositional interpretation
has been articulated by Adams and others by defining a suitable probabilistic
semantics.1 The strict interpretation, which goes back to the Stoics, has been
mainly treated in standard modal logic. Instead, the evidential interpretation is
relatively underdeveloped. The idea of support is hard to capture at the formal
level, and the same goes for its closest relatives, such as the notion of reason.
This explains the heterogeneity and the multiplicity of the attempts that have
been made to define a conditional with such a property.2
1Adams [?].
2Rott [?] and Rott [?] develop an account of “difference-making” conditionals within the
framework of belief revision theory. Spohn [?] oulines a ranking-theoretic account of condi-
tionals along the same lines. The approach outlined in Douven [?] and Douven [?], perhaps
the closest precedent of our analysis, employs the notion of evidential support in Bayesian
epistemology. Krzyzanowska, Wenmackers, and Douven [?], van Rooij and Schulz [?], and
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In what follows, we outline a precise and well defined version of the eviden-
tial interpretation which hinges on a quantitative measure of evidential support.
In order to spell out in a perspicuous way the relations between the evidential
interpretation so understood and the other two interpretations, we will adopt
a unified formal framework that rests on fairly uncontroversial assumptions.
Basically, all we need as a background theory is propostional logic and the
probability calculus. This framework provides a good basis for comparing the
three interpretations and elucidating their logic. As we shall see, some interest-
ing principles that involve different kinds of non-material conditionals can be
expressed and assessed in our language. Moreover, it allows for a probabilistic
reduction of the strict interpretation, which is interesting in itself.3
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces a language that
includes three symbols⇒, .,J that stand respectively for the suppositional con-
ditional, the evidential conditional, and the strict conditional.4 Section 3 defines
validity along the lines suggested by Adams. Section 4 outlines a set of prin-
ciples of conditional logic and states some important relations between them.
Sections 5-7 explain, for each of the three symbols, what kind of considerations
can justify its use, and how it behaves with respect to the principles outlined.
Section 8 adds some general remarks on the relations between the three inter-
pretations considered. The remaining part of the paper is a technical appendix
which contains the proofs of all the facts set out in the previous sections.
2 The language L
Let P be a standard propositional language whose alphabet is constituted by a
finite set of sentence letters p, q, r..., the connectives ∼,⊃,∧,∨, and the brackets
(, ). We will call propositional formulas the formulas of P, and use the symbol
PL to indicate logical consequence in P. Let L be a language with the following
alphabet:





The formulas of L are defined by induction as follows:
Definition 1.
1 If α ∈ P, then α ∈ L;
Berto and Özgün [?] provide further examples.
3One might wonder whether a similar comparison can be carried out by relying on a modal
semantics, given that there are modal treatments of the suppositional interpretation, and
that the strict interpretation is naturally understood in modal terms. The modal semantics
provided in Crupi and Iacona [?] shows that such discussion is possible, although it will not
be pursued here. Raidl, Iacona and Crupi [?] provides a completeness result in the modal
framework for the logic of the evidential conditional.
4The symbol ⇒ is used exactly as in Adams. The symbol . is borrowed from Spohn [?].
The symbol J is a tribute to the seminal work on strict implication in Lewis [?].
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2 if α ∈ P, then α ∈ L;
3 if α ∈ P and β ∈ P, then α⇒ β ∈ L;
4 if α ∈ P and β ∈ P, then α . β ∈ L;
5 if α ∈ P and β ∈ P, then α J β ∈ L;
6 if α ∈ L, then ∼α ∈ L.
Note that clause 2 rules out multiple occurrences of  in the same formula.
For example, (p ∧ q) is not a formula of L. Similarly, clauses 3-5 rule out
multiple occurrences of ⇒, .,J in the same formula. For example, p⇒ (p⇒ q)
is not a formula of L. Moreover, since clause 6 is the only clause that applies
to formulas of L, ∼ is the only connective whose scope can include the scope of
,♦,⇒, .,J.
The idea that underlies the semantics of L, which is in line with a tradition
initiated by Adams, is to define a valuation function for sentences depending on
the probability of their propositional constituents, that is, the constituents that
are adequately formalized in a standard propositional language. The function
V is defined as follows for any probability function P over P:
Definition 2.
1 For every α ∈ P, VP (α) = P (α);
2 VP (α) =
{ 1 if P (α) = 1
0 otherwise;
3 VP (α⇒ β) =
{ P (β|α) ifP (α) > 0
1 if P (α) = 0;
4 VP (α . β) =
{ P (β|α)−P (β)
1−P (β) if P (β|α) ≥ P (β), P (α) > 0 and P (β) < 1,
1 if P (α) = 0 or P (β) = 1,
0 otherwise;
5 VP (α J β) =
{
1 if P (β|α) = 1or P (α) = 0
0 otherwise;
6 VP (∼α) = 1− VP (α).
One straightforward way to understand V is as a measure of assertibility: for
any α, VP (α) represents the degree of assertibility of α given P . From now on
we will take this interpretation for granted. But we would like to emphasize that
our formal treatment is consistent with other interpretations. P , in turn, may
be understood in more than one way. A natural option is to take its values to
represent epistemic probabilities. But our formal treatment is also compatible
with a reading of P in terms of objective chance.
Clause 1 says that VP assigns to the propositional formulas the same values
as P . This means that the degree of assertibility of any propositional formula
amounts to its probability.
Clause 2 says that a formula α takes either 1, the maximal value, or 0, the
minimal value, depending on whether or not P (α) = 1.
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Clause 3 says that the value that VP assigns to α ⇒ β is the conditional
probability of β given α, with the proviso that VP (α ⇒ β) = 1 if P (α) = 0
(normally, P (β|α) would be undefined in that case). This is essentially Adam’s
idea that the degree of assertibility of a conditional is the conditional probability
of its consequent given its antecedent.5
Clause 4 is the crucial one. The value that VP assigns to α . β is the degree
of evidential support (if any) that α provides to β relative to P (with the pro-
viso that VP (α . β) = 1 if P (β) = 1 or P (α) = 0, in which case the evidential
support measure loses mathematical meaning). This conveys the assumption
that the antecedent has to contribute positively to the credibility of the con-
sequent, because the measure employed to quantify VP (α . β) gives a definite
positive value if and only if P (β|α) > P (β). The latter condition is a straightfor-
ward characterization of positive probabilistic relevance, and also the standard
qualitative definition of evidential support (or incremental confirmation) in a
Bayesian framework. It is well known that several quantitative measures retain
this fundamental idea, and here we will make no attempt to justify our specific
choice, which has been spelled out and defended elsewhere.6 We will simply
point out that there is a coherent sense in which the measure so defined char-
acterizes positive evidential impact as the degree of partial entailment of β by
α. In this sense, the degree of assertibility of α . β may be understood as the
degree of partial entailment — if any — from α to β.7
Clause 5 says that the value that VP assigns to α J β is 1 when P (β|α) = 1
or P (α) = 0, otherwise it is 0, given that P (β|α) = 1 or P (α) = 0 if and
only if there is no chance that α is true and β is false. As far as we can
see, this is the best approximation in the language of probability to the modal
condition that characterizes the strict conditional as traditionally understood,
namely, that it is impossible that α is true and β is false. Obviously, as long
as probability is understood epistemically, the same goes for the corresponding
notion of possibility.
Clause 6 defines negation in the classical way, as it entails that the value of
∼α is 1 when the value of α is 0, and that the value of ∼α is 0 when the value
of α is 1. In particular, when VP (∼∼α) = 1, we get that VP (∼α) = 0, which
means that ∼α is not necessary, hence that α is possible. This shows that ♦α
can be defined in the usual way as ∼∼α.
Note that clauses 3-5 entail that each of the three conditionals defined is
fully assertible whenever α PL β. Suppose that α PL β. Then, if P (α) = 0,
VP (α ⇒ β) = VP (α . β) = VP (α J β) = 1. If P (α) > 0, then again VP (α ⇒
β) = VP (α . β) = VP (α J β) = 1, because P (β|α) = 1.
As emerges from the definitions just outlined, our threefold formal account of
non-material conditionals inherits certain features of the probabilistic tradition
which some reader may legitimately see as potential threats or limitations. It is
then sensible to comment on them at this stage. The main point to emphasize
is that these features do not depend on specific properties of . or J, and that
5Adams [?]. About the stipulation that VP (α ⇒ β) = 1 if P (α) = 0, see Adams [?], p.
150.
6The details are in Crupi and Tentori [?] and in Crupi and Tentori [?]. Related ideas are
thoroughly discussed in Douven [?] and Douven [?].
7An alternative definition, which would deserve careful consideration, is obtained by re-
moving the second line, that VP (α . β) = 1 when P (α) = 0 or P (β) = 1. The rationale would
be that in these two cases α is incapable of making a difference to β. We owe this interesting
suggestion to an anonymous reviewer.
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the account itself does not introduce any new technical or conceptual difficulty.
First of all, there is nothing exceptional in the limited expressive power of
L. In particular, setting aside compounds and embeddings of non-propositional
formulas is a standard move in probabilistic approaches to non-material con-
ditionals, if only for technical reasons. A more subtle limitation is perhaps
the choice to work with a finite set of sentence letters. The motivation here is
again instrumental: our symbolic apparatus is sufficient for many applications
targeting reasoning and language, while also allowing for a smooth connection
between necessity and probability. Overall, it is significantly richer than usual
in the literature, and anyway comprehensive enough to express a large set of
important principles that are relevant for our purposes.
So-called triviality results are another case in point. One might think that
these results pose a crucial challenge to Adams’ analysis of conditionals, what
we call the suppositional interpretation.8 However, no additional problem is
raised by the evidential and the strict interpretation in this respect. In fact,
the semantic values attached to formulas in corresponding clauses of definition
2 are not even probabilities in the first place, so no straightforward extension of
traditional triviality results would apply.
A third issue, which has been widely discussed in connection with the pre-
vious one, is whether conditionals have truth-conditions. Surely, the approach
we take here has been popular among authors, such as Edgington, who firmly
reject the idea of truth-conditions for non-material conditionals.9 For readers
with such inclinations, a key expected outcome of our work is to show that two
further kinds of non-material conditional are tractable within their own favourite
framework. As it happens, however, we do not think that our approach is in-
compatible with the idea that conditionals have truth conditions. Even if a
plausible truth-conditional theory of non-material conditionals exists, it is still
legitimate and potentially fruitful to spell out their assertibility conditions in
probabilistic terms.
3 Validity
In order to define validity in L it is convenient to adopt a function U such that
UP (α) = 1 − VP (α) for any α and any P . As long as V is understood as a
measure of assertibility, UP (α) represents the lack of assertibility of α given P ,
what Adams calls the uncertainty of α relative to P . Following Adams, we will
define validity in terms of U :
Definition 3.
α1, ...αn  β if and only if, for any P , UP (α1) + ...+ UP (αn) ≥ UP (β)
In Adams’ terminology, a valid argument is an argument in which the un-
certainty of the conclusion cannot exceed the total uncertainty of the premises.
Definition 3 preserves the classical notion of logical consequence in at least
two crucial respects. First, as Adams has shown, all classically valid arguments




then α1, ...αn  β. We will use the label PL whenever we rely on this fact.10
Second, the rule of Substitution of Logical Equivalents (SLE) is valid:
Fact 1. If α PL β, α occurs in γ, and γ′ is obtained from γ by replacing α
with β, then γ  γ′.
As will be shown in the appendix, SLE plays an important role in the proof of
many technically useful results. This rule entails two rules for conditionals that
are sometimes treated separately. One is Left Logical Equivalence: if α PL β,
then α > γ is equivalent to β > γ. The second is Right Logical Equivalence: if
β PL γ, then α > β is equivalent to α > γ.
From definitions 2 and 3 we also get two important results concerning the
connection between⇒, .,J, namely, that . is stronger than⇒ and J is stronger
than ..
Fact 2. α . β  α⇒ β but α⇒ β 2 α . β
Fact 3. α J β  α . β but α . β 2 α J β
This makes perfect sense. If α supports β, then it is reasonable to expect
that β is credible enough given α, and if α necessitates β, then it is reasonable to
expect that α supports β. In fact necessitation may be regarded as the strongest
kind of support.
4 Principles of conditional logic
Before dealing with the symbols ⇒, .,J one by one, it is useful to list thirty
principles of conditional logic that we will discuss in connection with them, and
spell out some important relations between these principles. In what follows, >
indicates a conditional without specifying its interpretation, > and ⊥ stand for
tautology and contradiction,  and ♦ stand for ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’, and
the long arrow =⇒ indicates valid inference.11
10Adams [?], p. 38.
11Some sources for our list are Arló-Costa and Egré [?], Douven [?], Huber [?], Unterhuber
[?], Unterhuber [?].
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Superclassicality (S): If α PL β, then α > β must hold
Material Implication (MI): α > β =⇒ α ⊃ β
Detachment (DET): > > α =⇒ α
Modus Ponens (MP): α > β, α =⇒ β
Conjunction of Consequents (CC): α > β, α > γ =⇒ α > (β ∧ γ)
Disjunction of Antecedents (DA): α > γ, β > γ =⇒ (α ∨ β) > γ
Necessary Consequent (NC): α =⇒ β > α
Impossible Antecedent (IA): ∼α =⇒ α > β
Cautious Monotonicity (CM): α > β, α > γ =⇒ (α ∧ β) > γ
Negation Rationality (NR): α > γ,∼((α ∧ ∼β) > γ) =⇒ (α ∧ β) > γ
Rational Monotonicity (RM): α > γ,∼(α > ∼β) =⇒ (α ∧ β) > γ
Right Weakening (RW): If β PL γ, then α > β =⇒ α > γ
Conversion (CON): α =⇒ > > α
Conjunctive Sufficiency (CS): α ∧ β =⇒ α > β
Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM): ∼(α > β) =⇒ α > ∼β
Limited Transitivity (LT): α > β, (α ∧ β) > γ =⇒ α > γ
Conditional Equivalence (CE): α > β, β > α, β > γ =⇒ α > γ
False Antecedent (FA): ∼α =⇒ α > β
True Consequent (TC): β =⇒ α > β
Monotonicity (M): α > γ =⇒ (α ∧ β) > γ
Transitivity (T): α > β, β > γ =⇒ α > γ
Contraposition (C): α > β =⇒ ∼β > ∼α
Conditional Proof (CP): If Γ, α PL β, then Γ =⇒ α > β
Empty Antecedent Strengthening (EAS): > > α =⇒ β > α
Prelinearity (PRE): ∼(α > β) =⇒ β > α
Complementary Antecedent (CA): ∼(α > β) =⇒ ∼α > β
Restricted Selectivity (RS): If β PL ∼γ, then ♦α, α > β =⇒ ∼(α > γ)
Restricted Conditional Non-Contradiction (RCN): ♦α, α > β =⇒ ∼(α > ∼β)
Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis (RAT): ♦α =⇒ ∼(α > ∼α)
Restricted Aristotle’s Second Thesis (RAST): ♦∼β, α > β =⇒ ∼(∼α > β)
This list includes both principles that only involve conditional formulas, such
as CM or T, and principles that also involve non-conditional formulas, with or
without modal operators, such as NC or MI. Apart from the last four principles,
which may be labelled connexive principles, the principles listed above hold for
the material conditional.12 This means that they hold if > is replaced by ⊃.
As we shall see, the suppositional interpretation, the evidential interpretation,
and the strict interpretation differ from the material interpretation — and from
each other — with respect to these principles, because we get different results
if we replace > with ⇒, ., or J.
The principles listed above are related in various ways, so they cannot be
accepted or rejected independently of each other. In particular, we will rely on
the following facts, some of which are well known, which hold for any reading
of >.
Fact 4. If MI holds, then DET holds as well, given PL.
Fact 5. If MI holds, then MP holds as well, given PL.
12On connexive principles in general see McCall [?] and Wansing [?]. Some restricted
versions of connexive principles, which require contingent antecedents, have been considered in
Kapsner [?], Unterhuber [?], and Iacona [?], although, as far as we know, no similar restriction
on consequents has been suggested so far.
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Fact 6. If LT and S hold, then RW holds as well.
Fact 7. If M and CON hold, then TC holds as well.
Fact 8. If CM and CEM hold, then RM holds as well.
Fact 9. If T and S hold, then M holds as well.13
Fact 10. If C and RW hold, then M holds as well.14
Fact 11. If C and CC hold, then DA holds as well.
Fact 12. If S, CC, CE hold, then LT holds as well.15
Fact 13. If CP holds, then FA and TC hold as well, given PL.
Fact 14. If CON and EAS hold, then TC holds as well.
Fact 15. If NC holds, and either C holds or RW, S, CC hold, then IA holds as
well.
Fact 16. If RS holds, then RCN holds as well.
Fact 17. If RCN and S hold, then RAT holds as well.
Fact 18. if C and RS hold, then RAST holds as well.
5 The suppositional conditional
Now we will deal with the symbols ⇒, .,J one by one, starting with ⇒. Since
the logic of the suppositional conditional is well known, we will simply recall
some established results and add some details that matter for our purposes.
The first seventeen principles in our list hold for⇒.16 Of these principles, we
will prove only NC and IA, which are seldom discussed in the literature because
they involve modal operators.
Fact 19. α  β ⇒ α (Necessary Consequent X)
Fact 20. ∼α  α⇒ β (Impossible Antecedent X)
Now consider FA, TC, M, T, and C. These principles do no hold for ⇒.
Fact 21. ∼α 2 α⇒ β (False Antecedent ×)
Fact 22. β 2 α⇒ β (True Consequent ×)
Fact 23. α⇒ γ 2 (α ∧ β)⇒ γ (Monotonicity ×)
Fact 24. α⇒ β, β ⇒ γ 2 α⇒ γ (Transitivity ×)
Fact 25. α⇒ β 2 ∼β ⇒ ∼α (Contraposition ×)
13Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor [?], pp. 180-181.
14Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor [?], pp. 180-181.
15Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor [?], p. 179. Fact 12 also follows from a result given in
Gärdenfors and Rott [?], p. 54.
16Adams [?], chapter 7. See also Lehmann and Magidor [?].
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According to Adams, facts 21-25 speak in favour of the suppositional reading
of ‘if’. His point is that if the material reading of ‘if’ is adopted, some apparently
invalid arguments that instantiate FA, TC, M, T, and C must be treated as valid,
which is quite implausible.17
Note that, while plain monotonicity fails for ⇒, other weaker principles —
CM, RM, and NR — license similar inferences under additional conditions.18
Similarly, while plain transitivity fails for ⇒, LT and CE remain valid.
Now let us consider CP and EAS. These two principles also fail.
Fact 26. Not: if Γ, α PL β, then Γ  α⇒ β (Conditional Proof ×)19
Fact 27. > ⇒ α 2 β ⇒ α (Empty Antecedent Strengthening ×)
PRE and CA are further principles that hold for ⊃ but not for ⇒.
Fact 28. ∼(α⇒ β) 2 β ⇒ α (Prelinearity ×)
Fact 29. ∼(α⇒ β) 2 ∼α⇒ β (Complementary Antecedent ×)
Facts 28 and 29 may be regarded as desirable results. It reasonable to expect
that in some cases it is right to deny α > β even though it is wrong to assert
β > α, or ∼α > β.20
Finally, RS, RCN, and RAT hold for ⇒, while RAST does not.
Fact 30. If β PL ∼γ, then ♦α, α⇒ β  ∼(α⇒ γ) (Restricted Selectivity X)
Fact 31. ♦α, α⇒ β  ∼(α⇒ ∼β) (Restricted Conditional Non-Contradiction
X)
Fact 32. ♦α  ∼(α⇒ ∼α) (Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis X)
Fact 33. ♦∼β, α⇒ β 2 ∼(∼α⇒ β) (Restricted Aristotle’s Second Thesis ×)
All things considered,⇒ is preferable to ⊃ in some respects, in that it inval-
idates some principles that hold for ⊃ but may be perceived as counterintuitive,
such as FA or TC, while it retains other principles that hold for ⊃ and are widely
accepted as correct, such as S or MP. However, the behaviour of ⇒ is not sat-
isfactory in all respects, and this explains at least in part why the debate on
conditionals has moved on after Adams. Here we will provide four observations,
each of which points out a possible source of perplexity.
Observation 1 : it is not obvious that CS should be preserved. Several crit-
ics have regarded this principle as an unsettling contamination of the truth-
functional account in the logic of non-material conditionals, and we are inclined
to agree with them.21 The sheer fact that α and β hold seems not enough to
claim α > β, unless some further connection holds between them. For exam-
ple, there may be something wrong in the following conditional even if Susan is
actually a red-haired doctor:
(1) If Susan is red-haired, then she is a doctor
17Adams [?], pp. 166-167.
18For discussions of Rational Monotonicity and Negation Rationality, see Kraus, Lehmann,
and Magidor [?], p. 197, Lehmann and Magidor [?], and Bennett [?], p. 332.
19See Edgington [?], p. 176.
20See Edgington [?], p. 171.
21Butcher [?], Bennett [?], pp. 239-240.
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Remarkably, Adams himself labels CS a “rather strange inference” and retreats
on a Gricean escape to accommodate it. However, this is the same kind of move
that is usually regarded as insufficient to relieve the truth-functional account
from the counterintuitive effects of FA and TC.22
Observation 2 : it is not obvious that CEM should be preserved. The in-
tuitive status of this principle is notoriously controversial.23 There seem to be
cases in which it is correct to deny α > β while it is incorrect to assert α > ∼β.
For example, even if it may be right to deny (1), this does not make it right to
assert (2):
(2) If Susan is red-haired, then she is not a doctor
Adams assumes that ∼(α > β) simply means α > ∼β, and other theorists
of conditionals agree on this assumption.24 But CEM can hardly be defended
by appealing to meaning, given that the whole debate on conditionals stems
precisely from the fact that it is not entirely clear what ‘if’ means.25
Observation 3 : it is not entirely clear that C is to be rejected. Although
many theorists of conditionals follow Adams and think that C must fail, others
are apt to think that C can coherently be preserved. The alleged counterex-
amples to C, such as the following, have been widely discussed, and there is no
obvious way to handle them.
(3) If John makes a mistake, it is not a big mistake
(4) If John does not make a big mistake, it is not a mistake
In particular, one thing that has been noted is that such counterexamples imply
that their premise is naturally understood as a concessive conditional. (3) can
be rephrased by using ‘even if’ instead of ‘if’. This means that such counterex-
amples would loose their grip on any account of > which rules out the concessive
reading.26
Observation 4 : the suppositional treatment of the connexive principles is
not ideal. On the one hand, ⇒ validates RS, RCN, and RAT, which are quite
reasonable principles. On the other hand, however, it invalidates RAST, which
is also reasonable to some extent. Consider the following conditionals:
(5) If it is cold, then it is not raining
(6) If it is not cold, then it is not raining
As long as one thinks that the assertibility of a conditional requires that its
antecedent supports its consequent, one can hardly accept that both (5) and (6)
hold. This is probably why many people would naturally refrain from asserting
(5) and (6) together.
22Adams [?], p. 157. CS has been a matter of discussion within non-probabilistic variants
of the suppositional interpretation. Most notably, Lewis [?] does not treat CS as an essential
principle.
23See for example Cross [?], and Williams [?].
24Adams [?], p. 181.
25As in the case of CS, CEM has been a matter of discussion within non-probabilistic
variants of the suppositional interpretation. While Stalnaker [?] accepts it, Lewis [?] rejects
it.
26Lycan [?], p. 34, Bennett [?], pp. 32 and 143-144. A recent and forceful defense of
contraposition for non-concessive conditionals is provided in Gomes [?].
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As the next two sections show, the evidential interpretation and the strict
interpretation provide different but equally motivated answers to the questions
raised by these four observations. So they may be regarded as interesting alter-
natives to the suppositional interpretation.
6 The evidential conditional
As we have seen, much of the appeal of the suppositional interpretation lies in
the fact that it invalidates some principles that hold for ⊃ but may be perceived
as counterintuitive, while it retains other principles that hold for ⊃ and are
widely accepted as correct. The evidential interpretation preserves this virtue,
although it significantly differs from the suppositional interpretation in some
crucial respects which are directly relevant to observations 1-4.
First of all, consider S, MI, DET, MP, CC, C, and DA. These principles hold
for ., and the same goes for C:
Fact 34. If α PL β, then α . β (Superclassicality X)
Fact 35. α . β  α ⊃ β (Material Implication X)
Fact 36. > . α  α (Detachment X)
Fact 37. α . β, α  β (Modus Ponens X)
Fact 38. α . β, α . γ  α . (β ∧ γ) (Conjunction of Consequents X)
Fact 39. α . β  ∼β .∼α (Contraposition X)
Fact 40. α . γ, β . γ  (α ∨ β) . γ (Disjunction of Antecedents X)
As shown in the appendix, fact 39 is technically useful to connect facts 38
and 40. C marks a key difference between . and ⇒, and constitutes one of the
most interesting features of .. The reason is that ., unlike ⇒, rules out the
concessive reading of conditionals. α⇒ β can be highly assertible even though
α is irrelevant to β, or is at odds with β: a high probability of β given α is
enough. Instead, the assertibility of α . β requires not only that β is highly
probable if α is assumed, but that it is so at least in part because α is assumed.
Since the alleged counterexamples to C typically involve the concessive reading
of conditionals, as noted in observation 3, it makes sense that C holds for ..
For example, on the evidential interpretation (3) is hardly assertible, so the
inference from (3) to (4) is no counterexample to C.
Now consider principles NC, IA, CM, and NR. These principles hold for ..
Fact 41. α  β . α (Necessary Consequent X)
Fact 42. ∼α  α . β (Impossible Antecedent X)
Fact 43. α . β, α . γ  (α ∧ β) . γ (Cautious Monotonicity X)
Fact 44. α . γ,∼((α ∧ ∼β) . γ)  (α ∧ β) . γ (Negation Rationality X)
From what has been said so far it turns out that the first ten principles of
our list hold for .. Since the same principles hold for⇒, this shows that there is
a considerable overlap between . and ⇒, and consequently between ., ⇒, and
⊃.
11
Now we will focus on the principles that do not hold for ., and thereby
highlight some significant differences between . and ⇒. We have already seen
that ., unlike ⇒, validates C. Another difference is that ., unlike ⇒, violates
RM.
Fact 45. α . γ,∼(α .∼β) 2 (α ∧ β) . γ (Rational Monotonicity ×)
In the appendix, we prove this fact by means of an example. Suppose that
we are interested in the blood type of a person named Sara. Let α be ‘Sara’s
mother’s blood type is A’, let β be ‘Sara’s father’s blood type is B’, and let γ
be ‘Sara’s blood type is A’. The following probability distribution arises from
plausible background assumption and basic genetic theory:27
P (α ∧ β ∧ γ) = 0, 018
P (α ∧ β ∧ ∼γ) = 0, 052
P (α ∧ ∼β ∧ γ) = 0, 152
P (α ∧ ∼β ∧ ∼γ) = 0, 078
P (∼α ∧ β ∧ γ) = 0, 003
P (∼α ∧ β ∧ ∼γ) = 0, 160
P (∼α ∧ ∼β ∧ γ) = 0, 127
P (∼α ∧ ∼β ∧ ∼γ) = 0, 409
In the case described, the uncertainty of ‘If Sara’s mother’s blood is type A, then
Sara’s blood type is A’ is moderate. The uncertainty of ‘It is not the case that,
if Sara’s mother’s blood type is A, then Sara’s father’s blood type is not B’ is
null, because the antededent and the consequent of the negated conditional are
statistically independent, so the negation of such evidential conditional is fully
assertible. Instead, the uncertainty of ‘If Sara’s mother’s blood type is A and
Sara’s father’s blood type is B, then Sara’s blood type is A’ is maximal, because
the probability of the consequent is not increased (in fact it is decreased) by the
probability of the antecedent.
Fact 45 shows that there is at least one sense in which . is less monotonic
than⇒. This is clear if one thinks that, in the case decribed above, the inference
would go through if the suppositional interpretation were adopted. For UP (α⇒
γ) = 1−VP (α⇒ γ) = 1−P (γ|α) = 0, 44, and UP (∼(α⇒ ∼β)) = 1−VP (∼(α⇒
∼β) = 1−P (β|α) = 1−P (β) = 0, 77, so UP (α⇒ γ) +UP (∼(α⇒ ∼β) = 1, 21,
while UP ((α ∧ β) ⇒ γ) = 1 − VP ((α ∧ β) ⇒ γ) = 1 − P (γ|α ∧ β) = 0, 75. The
main difference concern the second premise, whose uncertainty is null for . but
quite high for ⇒.
Two corollaries of fact 45 are that M and RW do not hold for ..
Fact 46. α . γ 2 (α ∧ β) . γ (Monotonicity ×)
Fact 47. Not: if β PL γ, then α . β  α . γ (Right Weakening ×)
27The underlying hypothetical distribution of blood phenotypes 0, A, B, AB is 40%, 30%,
23%, 7%. Assuming a Hardy-Weinberg model, the corresponding genotype distribution for
AA, BB, 00, AB, A0, B0 is 4%, 3%, 40%, 7%, 26%, 20% respectively (figures rounded). All
other figures are implied given random mating (another standard background condition) and
a basic Mendelian model of inheritance, with alleles A and B dominant and 0 recessive.
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Fact 46 shows that . is exactly like⇒ as far as M is concerned. Instead, fact
47 shows that . and⇒ differ with respect to RW, which is quite interesting. RW
is one of the most entrenched and technically powerful rules of traditional logics
for conditionals. Yet, as puzzling as it may seem at first sight, the failure of
RW is a very natural outcome for evidential conditionals.28 Note that, at least
since the debate between Hempel and Carnap, it is clear that evidential support
must fail the so-called “special consequence condition”.29 In fact if α and β are
probabilistically independent propositional formulas, and 0 < P (α)P (β) < 1,
then α provides evidential support to α∧ β but not to β, that is, P (α∧ β|α) >
P (α ∧ β) while P (β|α) = P (β), in spite of the fact that α ∧ β PL β.
From the failure of M and RW we can also conclude that T, LT, and CE do
not hold for ..
Fact 48. α . β, β . γ 2 α . γ (Transitivity ×)
Fact 49. α . β, (α ∧ β) . γ 2 α . γ (Limited Transitivity ×)
Fact 50. α . β, β . α, β . γ 2 α . γ (Conditional Equivalence ×)
Another important difference between⇒ and . concerns CS and CEM. These
two principles do not hold for ..
Fact 51. α ∧ β 2 α . β (Conjunction Sufficiency ×)
Fact 52. ∼(α . β) 2 α .∼β (Conditional Excluded Middle ×)
As it emerges from facts 51 and 52, the evidential interpretation differs
from the suppositional interpretation in that it provides opposite answers to
the questions raised in observations 1 and 2. First, according to the evidential
interpretation there are cases in which α > β can reasonably be denied even
though α and β hold. For example, if one denies (1), one does so because
‘Susan is red-haired’ provides no support for ‘Susan is a doctor’, independently
of Susan’s actual hair colour or profession. Second, according to the evidential
interpretation there are cases in which it is correct to deny α > β while it is
incorrect to assert α > ∼β. For example, it is perfectly consistent to deny both
(1) and (2), for in both cases the antecedent does not support the consequent.
As far as FA, TC, CP, PRE, and CA are concerned, . behaves exactly like
the ⇒, and unlike ⊃.
Fact 53. ∼α 2 α . β (False Antecedent ×)
Fact 54. β 2 α . β (True Consequent ×)
Fact 55. Not: if Γ, α PL β, then Γ  α . β (Conditional Proof ×)
Fact 56. ∼(α . β) 2 β . α (Prelinearity ×)
Fact 57. ∼(α . β) 2 ∼α . β (Complementary Antecedent ×)
Two further differences between ⇒ and . concern EAS and CON. While ⇒
validates the former but not the latter, . validates the latter but not the former.
28Rott [?], p. 7, takes the failure of RW to be the hallmark of “difference-making condi-
tionals”. Crupi and Iacona [?] provides a more detailed discussion of RW.
29Hempel [?], Carnap [?]
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Fact 58. > . α  β . α (Empty Antecedent Strengthening X)
Fact 59. α 2 > . α (Conversion ×)
Finally, consider the connexive principles. All these principles hold for ..
Fact 60. If β PL ∼γ, then ♦α, α . β  ∼(α . γ) (Restricted Selectivity X)
Fact 61. ♦α, α . β  ∼(α .∼β) (Restricted Conditional Non-Contradiction X)
Fact 62. ♦α  ∼(α .∼α) (Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis X)
Fact 63. ♦∼β, α . β  ∼(∼α . β) (Restricted Aristotle’s Second Thesis X)
Facts 60-63 show that the evidential interpretation provides a coherent treat-
ment of the connexive principles, including RAST.
From what has been said so far it turns out that . agrees with ⊃ and ⇒ on
several plausible principles. This is a distinctive feature of the evidential inter-
pretation as we understand it, which distinguishes it from similar accounts of
conditionals that have been provided so far. In particular, our analysis crucially
differs from Douven’s, which is perhaps its closest relative. The logic generated
by Douven’s approach is rather weak, as it fails five of the first ten principles of
our list, that is, MP, CC, DA, CM, and NR.30
As we have seen, . has a neatly distinctive logic and differs from ⇒ with
respect to each of the four issues raised in observations 1-4: the account outlined
invalidates CS and CEM, validates C, and provides a uniform treatment of the
connexive principles. So, the evidential interpretation may be regarded as a
coherent alternative to the suppositional interpretation.
7 The strict conditional
The strict interpretation is a different alternative to the suppositional interpre-
tation. On the strict reading of >, to assert α > β is to assert that there is
no chance that α holds but β does not hold. As noted in section 2, ‘chance’
may plausibly understood in its objective reading, as opposed to epistemic or
subjective probability. But in any case our account of J does not depend on
this distinction. As we will see, definition 2 implies that J preserves the logical
profile of the strict conditional as traditionally understood, and warrants the
equivalence between α J β and (α ⊃ β). This is why we take the label ‘strict’
to be appropriate, even though in a probabilistic framework.31
The strict interpretation agrees with the evidential interpretation in at least
two important respects. First, it preserves all the classical principles preserved
by the evidential interpretation. Second, it offers the same kind of responses to
the questions raised in observations 1-4, including the treatment of the connexive
principles. However, as we will see, J differs from . in other crucial respects.
Let us start with S, MI, DET, MP, CC, C, and DA. These principles hold
for J, and the same goes for C:
Fact 64. If α PL β, then α J β (Superclassicality X)
30See Douven [?], theorem 5.2.1, p. 130. A more thorough discussion of Douven is provided
in Crupi and Iacona [?].
31Iacona [?] outlines some general arguments for the strict interpretation.
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Fact 65. α J β  α ⊃ β (Material Implication X)
Fact 66. > . α  α (Detachment X)
Fact 67. α . β, α  β (Modus Ponens X)
Fact 68. α J β, α J γ  α J (β ∧ γ) (Conjunction of Consequents X)
Fact 69. α J β  ∼β J ∼α (Contraposition X)
Fact 70. α J γ, β J γ  (α ∨ β) J γ (Disjunction of Antecedents X)
NC and IA also hold for J.
Fact 71. α  β J α (Necessary Consequent X)
Fact 72. ∼α  α . β (Impossible Antecedent X)
The crucial difference between . and J is that J is fully transitive and
monotonic, in that T and M hold for J.
Fact 73. α J β, β J γ  α J γ (Transitivity X)
Fact 74. α J γ  (α ∧ β) J γ (Monotonicity X)
Although T and M may not accord with the evidential interpretation, they
make sense on the strict interpretation. If α necessitates β, and β necessitates
γ, then clearly α necessitates γ. Similarly, if α necessitates γ, then clearly
α ∧ β necessitates γ. In the literature on conditionals, there has been plenty
of discussion about the alleged counterexamples to T and M, and there is no
widespread agreement about them. The strict interpretation may be combined
with some accounts of these cases that explain away the apparent violation of
T and M.32
From facts 73 and 74 we obtain some important corollaries: CE, LT, RW,
and RM hold for J, while they do not hold for ..
Fact 75. α J β, β J α, β J γ  α J γ (Conditional Equivalence X)
Fact 76. α J β, (α ∧ β) J γ  α J γ (Limited Transitivity X)
Fact 77. If β PL γ, then α J β  α J γ (Right Weakening X)
Fact 78. α J γ,∼(α J ∼β)  (α ∧ β) J γ (Rational Monotonicity X)
The divergence between . and J emerges clearly if we focus on RM. As we
have seen, in the case of Sara the evidential interpretation makes the argument
invalid because it implies that the second premise is certain: ‘It is not the case
that, if Sara’s mother’s blood type is A, then Sara’s father’s blood type is not
B’. In fact this is the key difference between . and⇒. The strict interpretation,
instead, makes the argument valid because it raises the uncertainty of the first
premise. More precisely, we have that VP (α J γ) = 0, VP (∼(α J ∼β)) = 1,
and VP ((α ∧ β) J γ) = 0, so UP (α J γ) + UP (∼(α J ∼β)) = UP ((α ∧ β) J
γ) = 1. So the strict interpretation agrees with the evidential interpretation on
the certainty of the second premise, but it preserves RM because it poses higher
constraints on the assertibility of the first premise.
Obviously, since M holds for J, the same goes for CM, NR, and EAS, which
are weaker. In this respect, J agrees with ..
32Iacona [?] outlines such an account.
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Fact 79. α J β, α J γ  (α ∧ β) J γ (Cautious Monotonicity X)
Fact 80. α J γ,∼((α ∧ ∼β) J γ)  (α ∧ β) J γ (Negation Rationality X)
Fact 81. > J α  β J α (Empty Antecedent Strengthening X)
The agreement between J and . also concerns FA, TC, CON, CS, CEM,
CP, PRE, and CA, which do not hold for J.
Fact 82. ∼α 2 α J β (False Antecedent ×)
Fact 83. β 2 α J β (True Consequent ×)
Fact 84. α 2 > J α (Conversion ×)
Fact 85. α ∧ β 2 α J β (Conjunctive Sufficiency ×)
Fact 86. ∼(α J β) 2 α J ∼β (Conditional Excluded Middle ×)
Fact 87. Not: if Γ, α PL β, then Γ  α J β (Conditional Proof ×)
Fact 88. ∼(α J β) 2 β J α (Prelinearity ×)
Fact 89. ∼(α J β) 2 ∼α J β (Complementary Antecedent ×)
These principles do not hold for J for the same reason for which they do
not hold for ., namely, that the connection between antecedent and consequent
implied by J would not be preserved if they were valid.
As far as the connexive principles are concerned, J behaves exactly like ..
Fact 90. If β PL ∼γ, then ♦α, α J β  ∼(α J γ) (Restricted Selectivity X)
Fact 91. ♦α, α J β  ∼(α J ∼β) (Restricted Conditional Non-Contradiction
X)
Fact 92. ♦α  ∼(α J ∼α) (Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis X)
Fact 93. ♦∼β, α J β  ∼(∼α J β) (Restricted Aristotle’s Second Thesis X)
From facts 90-93 it turns out that the strict interpretation provides a coher-
ent treatment of the connexive principles, just like the evidential interpretation.
The following table summarizes what has been said so far and provides an overall
picture of our results.
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⊃ ⇒ . J
S Superclassicality X X X X
MI Material Implication X X X X
DET Detachment X X X X
MP Modus Ponens X X X X
CC Conjunction of Consequents X X X X
DA Disjunction of Antecedents X X X X
NC Necessary Consequent X X X X
IA Impossible Antecedent X X X X
CM Cautious Monotonicity X X X X
NR Negation Rationality X X X X
RM Rational Monotonicity X X × X
RW Right Weakening X X × X
CON Conversion X X × ×
CS Conjunctive Sufficiency X X × ×
CEM Conditional Excluded Middle X X × ×
LT Limited Transitivity X X × X
CE Conditional Equivalence X X × X
FA False Antecedent X × × ×
TC True Consequent X × × ×
M Monotonicity X × × X
T Transitivity X × × X
C Contraposition X × X X
CP Conditional Proof X × × ×
EA Empty Antecedent Strengthening X × X X
PRE Prelinearity X × × ×
CA Complementary Antecedent X × × ×
RS Restricted Selectivity × X X X
RC Restricted Conditional Non-Contradiction × X X X
RAT Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis × X X X
RAST Restricted Aristotle’s Second Thesis × × X X
As the table shows, . and J agree in several important respects. The dif-
ference between J and . lies in the fact that J validates five principles that do
not hold for ., namely, RM, RW, LT, CE, M, and T. By contrast, there is no
principle that is validated by . but not by J.
As a matter of fact, J is exactly as strong as the necessitation of ⊃, as the
following equivalence holds.
Fact 94. α J β  (α ⊃ β)
This shows that, insofar as conditionals are adequately formalized as strict
conditionals, we can express their logical properties in L instead of employing
a standard modal language. Of course, modal logic works perfectly well, and
many people take possible worlds to be entirely acceptable theoretical entities,
or at least no more problematic than probabilities. However, one might be
apt to believe that probabilities are theoretically kosher in some sense in which
possible worlds are not, or prefer probabilities for purely instrumental reasons.
If you belong to the second category, then here there is something for you. You
can have the logic of the strict conditional, but without possible worlds.
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8 Final remarks
In the foregoing sections we have spelled out three non-material interpretations
of ‘if then’ — the suppositional interpretation, the evidential interpretation,
and the strict interpretation — by elucidating some characteristic properties of
the symbols ⇒, ., J. This last section provides some final remarks about the
relations between these symbols.
As facts 2 and 3 show, our three symbols can be ordered in terms of increasing
strength as follows: ⇒, .,J. It is important to note, howewer, that this does not
mean that the logic of each of these three symbols is an extension of the logic
of the symbol that precedes it, in the sense that it preserves all the principles
that hold for the symbol that precedes it. Although it may be reasonable to
conjecture that the logic of J is an extension of the logic of ., it is certainly not
the case that the logic of . is an extension of the logic of ⇒, that is, ⇒ and .
have different logics, neither of which is an extension of the other. We take this
to be a major implication of our results.
In fact, the distinction between the suppositional interpretation and the
evidential interpretation deserves careful consideration. As the facts stated in
section 6 show — the most important results of this paper — these two interpre-
tations may be regarded as two alternative and complementary ways to depart
from the material interpretation and abandon full monotonicity. Consider M.
As fact 10 shows, the rejection of M forces the failure of at least one among RW
and C: the logic of ⇒ retains the former, while the logic of . retains the latter,
and each option finds a coherent theoretical motivation in the corresponding
reading of ‘if’. A very similar pattern arises from the rejection of TC, which is a
distinctive “paradox” of the material conditional, because this rejection imposes
a choice between CON and EAS, as is shown by fact 14.
More generally, each of the three interpretations considered has interesting
logical implications, and finds some support in the ordinary use of ‘if’. These
three interpretations may be regarded either as three distinct meanings that
speakers attach to ‘if’, or as three ways of explicating a single indeterminate
meaning by replacing it with a precise and well defined counterpart. The sec-
ond option leaves open the question of whether there is a unique correct analysis
of conditionals. Some theorists of conditionals work under the assumption that
there is such an analysis, while others are inclined to think that different ac-
counts of conditionals may be equally correct. We believe that the contents
presented here are to a large extent neutral with respect to this divide. If there
is a unique correct analysis of conditionals, the results presented in the foregoing
sections may shed some light on such analysis. On the other hand, if different
formal accounts of conditionals are equally correct, the distinction between ⇒,
., and J suggests one definite way to carve the space of the possible options.
Appendix
In what follows we will adopt three methodological conventions. First, we will
use the letters α, β, γ to refer to propositional formulas, without specifying that
they belong to P. Second, we will use the letter P to refer to an arbitrary
probability function. Third, since definition 3 says that α1, ...αn  β if and only
if UP (α1)+ ...+UP (αn) ≥ UP (β), we will take for granted that in order to prove
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that α1, ...αn  β it suffices to show that UP (β) = 0, or that UP (αi) = 1 for at
least some αi in α1, ...αn.
Fact 1: If α PL β, α occurs in γ, and γ′ is obtained from γ by replacing α
with β, then γ  γ′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of γ, assuming that α PL
β, that α occurs in γ, that γ′ is obtained from γ by replacing α with β, and
that P is any probability function. The basis of the induction is the case in
which γ ∈ P. In this case γ PL γ′, therefore γ  γ′. In the inductive step
we assume that the result to be proved holds for any formula of complexity less
than or equal to n, and that γ is a formula of complexity n + 1. The possible
cases are five.
Case 1 : γ has the form δ. In this case γ′ = δ′. Since δ ∈ P, δ PL δ′. So,
P (δ) = P (δ′). By clause 2 of definition 2, it follows that VP (γ) = VP (γ
′), hence
that UP (γ) = UP (γ
′). Therefore, γ  γ′.
Case 2 : γ has the form δ ⇒ φ. In this case γ′ = δ′ ⇒ φ or γ′ = δ ⇒ φ′.
Suppose that γ′ = δ′ ⇒ φ. Since δ ∈ P, δ PL δ′. So, P (δ) = P (δ′), and
P (φ ∧ δ) = P (φ ∧ δ′). It follows that P (φ|δ) = P (φ|δ′) whenever P (δ) > 0. By
clause 3 of definition 2 this entails that VP (γ) = VP (γ
′), hence that UP (γ) =
UP (γ
′). The reasoning is similar if γ′ = δ ⇒ φ′. Therefore γ  γ′.
Case 3 : γ has the form δ . φ. This case is like case 2 but relies on clause 4 of
definition 2.
Case 4 : γ has the form δ J φ. This case is like 2 but relies on clause 5 of
definition 2.
Case 5 : γ has the form ∼δ. In this case γ′ = ∼δ′. Since δ has complexity n,
by the inductive hypothesis δ  δ′, so VP (δ) = VP (δ′). By clause 6, VP (∼δ) =
1 − VP (δ) and VP (∼δ′) = 1 − VP (δ′), so VP (∼δ) = VP (∼δ′). It follows that
UP (∼δ) = UP (∼δ′), hence that γ  γ′.
Fact 2: α . β  α⇒ β but α⇒ β 2 α . β
Proof. In order to prove that α . β  α⇒ β, three cases must be considered.
Case 1 : P (α) = 0 or P (β) = 1. In this case VP (α⇒ β) = 1, so UP (α⇒ β) = 0.
Therefore, UP (α . β) ≥ UP (α⇒ β).
Case 2 : P (α) > 1, P (β) < 1, and P (β|α) < P (β). In this case VP (α . β) = 0,
hence UP (α . β) = 1. Therefore, UP (α . β) ≥ UP (α⇒ β).
Case 3 : P (α) > 1, P (β) < 1, and P (β|α) ≥ P (β). In this case we have that
0 ≤ P (β)(P (α)− P (α ∧ β))
P (α ∧ β)− P (α ∧ β) ≤ P (α)P (β)− P (β)P (α ∧ β)
P (α ∧ β)− P (α)P (β) ≤ P (α ∧ β)− P (β)P (α ∧ β)
P (α ∧ β)
P (α)
− P (β) ≤ P (α ∧ β)− P (β)P (α ∧ β)
P (α)
P (β|α)− P (β) ≤ P (α ∧ β)(1− P (β))
P (α)
P (β|α)− P (β)
1− P (β)
≤ P (α ∧ β)
P (α)
This means that VP (α . β) ≤ VP (α⇒ β), so that UP (α . β) ≥ UP (α⇒ β).
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To prove that α ⇒ β 2 α . β it suffices to note that it can happen that 0 <
P (β|α) ≤ P (β). In this case VP (α ⇒ β) > VP (α . β), so UP (α ⇒ β) <
UP (α . β).
Fact 3: α J β  α . β but α . β 2 α J β
Proof. In order to prove that α J β  α . β, three cases must be considered.
Case 1 : P (α) = 0 or P (β) = 1. In this case VP (α . β) = 1, so UP (α . β) = 0.
Therefore, UP (α J β) ≥ UP (α . β).
Case 2 : P (α) > 0, P (β) < 1, and P (β|α) < 1. In this case VP (α J β) = 0, so
UP (α J β) = 1. Therefore, UP (α J β) ≥ UP (α . β).
Case 3 : P (α) > 0, P (β) < 1, and P (β|α) = 1. In this case P (β|α) − P (β) =
1−P (β), so VP (α.β) = 1 and UP (α.β) = 0. Therefore, UP (α J β) ≥ UP (α.β).
To prove that α . β 2 α J β it suffices to note that it can happen that P (β) <
P (β|α) < 1. In this case VP (α.β) > VP (α J β), so UP (α.β) < UP (α J β).
Fact 4: If MI holds, then DET holds as well, given PL.
Proof.
1 > > α A
2 > ⊃ α 1 MI
3 > PL
4 α 2,3 PL
Fact 5: If MI holds, then MP holds as well, given PL.
Proof.
1 α > β A
2 α A
3 α ⊃ β 1 MI
4 β 2,3 PL
Fact 6: If LT and S hold, then RW holds as well.
Proof.
1 α > β A
2 (α ∧ β) > γ S [assuming that β PL γ]
3 α > γ 1,2 LT
Fact 7: If M and CON hold, then TC holds as well.
Proof.
1 β A
2 > > β 1 CON
3 (> ∧ α) > β 2 M
4 α > β 3 SLE
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Fact 8: If CM and CEM hold, then RM holds as well.
Proof.
1 α > γ A
2 ∼(α > ∼β) A
3 α > β 2 CEM
4 (α ∧ β) > γ 1,3 CM
Fact 9: If T and S hold, then M holds as well.
Proof.
1 α > β A
2 (α ∧ γ) > α S
3 (α ∧ γ) > β 1,2 T
Fact 10: If C and RW hold, then M holds as well.
Proof.
1 α > γ A
2 ∼γ > ∼α 1 C
3 ∼γ > (∼α ∨ ∼β) 2 RW
4 ∼(∼α ∨ ∼β) > ∼∼γ 3 C
5 (α ∧ β) > γ 4 SLE
Fact 11: If C and CC hold, then DA holds as well.
Proof.
1 α > γ A
2 β > γ A
3 ∼γ > ∼α 1 C
4 ∼γ > ∼β 2 C
5 ∼γ > (∼α ∧ ∼β) 3,4 CC
6 ∼(∼α ∧ ∼β) > ∼∼γ 5 C
7 (α ∨ β) > γ 6 SLE
Fact 12: If S, CC, CE hold, then LT holds as well.
Proof.
1 α > β A
2 (α ∧ β) > γ A
3 α > α S
4 (α ∧ β) > α S
5 α > (α ∧ β) 1,3 CC
6 α > γ 2,4,5 CE
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Fact 13: If CP holds, then FA and TC hold as well, given PL.
Proof. Assume that CP holds. Since β, α PL β, we get that β =⇒ α > β. So
TC holds. Similarly, since α,∼α PL β, we get that ∼α =⇒ α > β. So FA
holds.
Fact 14: If CON and EAS hold, then TC holds as well.
Proof.
1 β A
2 > > β 1 CON
3 α > β 2 EAS




2 ∼β > ∼α 1 NC
3 ∼∼α > ∼∼β 2 C
4 α > β 3 SLE
1 ∼α A
2 α > ∼α 1 NC
3 α > (∼α ∨ β) 2 RW
4 α > α S
5 α > (α ∨ β) 4 RW
6 α > (∼α ∨ β) ∧ (α ∨ β) 3,5 CC
7 α > β 7 SLE
Fact 16: If RS holds, then RCN holds as well.
Proof.
1 ♦α A
2 α > β A
3 ∼(α > ∼β) 1,2 RS [because β PL ∼∼β]
Fact 17: If RCN and S hold, then RAT holds as well.
Proof.
1 ♦α A
2 α > α S
3 ∼(α > ∼α) 1,2 RCN
Fact 18: if C and RS hold, then RAST holds as well.




2 α > β A
3 ∼β > ∼α 2 C
4 ∼(∼β > α) 1,3 RS [because ∼α PL ∼α]
Second, note that if Γ, α  β, then Γ,∼β  ∼α. This can be seen as follows.
Either∼β ∈ Γ or∼β /∈ Γ. If∼β ∈ Γ, that is, if Γ = {∼β, γ1, ...γn}, then Γ, α  β
and Γ, α  ∼β, which entails that UP (∼β)+UP (γ1)+...+UP (γn)+UP (α) ≥ 1. It
follows that UP (∼β)+UP (γ1)+...+UP (γn)+UP (α)−UP (α) ≥ 1−UP (α), hence
that UP (∼β)+UP (γ1)+ ...+UP (γn) ≥ UP (∼α). If ∼β /∈ Γ, and Γ = {γ1, ...γn},
it suffices to think that γ1, ...γn, α  β if and only if UP (γ1) + ... + UP (γn) +
UP (α) ≥ UP (β), if and only if UP (γ1)+ ...+UP (γn)+(1−UP (β)) ≥ 1−UP (α),
if and only if UP (γ1) + ...+ UP (γn) + UP (∼β) ≥ UP (∼α).
Given that if Γ, α  β, then Γ,∼β  ∼α, from 4 above we obtain ∼(∼α > β),
because ∼α > β  ∼β > α by C and SLE.
Fact 19: α  β ⇒ α
Proof. Let α, β ∈ P and let P be any probability function. Two cases must be
considered.
Case 1 : P (α) = 1. In this case VP (β ⇒ α) = 1 no matter whether P (β) = 0 or
P (β) > 0, so UP (β ⇒ α) = 0. Therefore, UP (α) ≥ UP (β ⇒ α).
Case 2 : P (α) < 1. In this case VP (α) = 0, so UP (α) = 1. Therefore,
UP (α) ≥ UP (β ⇒ α).
Fact 20: ∼α  α⇒ β
Proof. Since RW, S, and CC hold for ⇒, from facts 15 and 19 we get that
∼α  α⇒ β.
Fact 21: ∼α 2 α⇒ β
Proof. Suppose that 0 < P (β) < 1, and posit α = ∼β. Then, UP (∼α) =
1− VP (∼α) = 1− P (∼α) = 1− P (β) < 1, but UP (α⇒ β) = 1− VP (α⇒ β) =
1− P (β|α) = 1− P (β|∼β) = 1. Therefore, UP (∼α) < UP (α⇒ β).
Fact 22: β 2 α⇒ β
Proof. Suppose that 0 < P (α) < 1, and posit β = ∼α. Then, UP (β) = 1 −
VP (β) = 1 − P (β) = 1 − P (∼α) < 1, but UP (α ⇒ β) = 1 − VP (α ⇒ β) =
1− P (β|α) = 1− P (∼α|α) = 1. Therefore, UP (β) < UP (α⇒ β).
Fact 23: α⇒ γ 2 (α ∧ β)⇒ γ
Proof. Suppose that α ⇒ γ  (α ∧ β) ⇒ γ. Since CON holds for ⇒, by fact 7
we get that β  α⇒ β, contrary to fact 22.
Fact 24: α⇒ β, β ⇒ γ 2 α⇒ γ
Proof. Suppose that α⇒ β, β ⇒ γ  α⇒ γ. Since S holds for ⇒, by fact 9 we
get that α⇒ γ  (α ∧ β)⇒ γ, contrary to fact 23.
Fact 25: α⇒ β 2 ∼β ⇒ ∼α
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Proof. Suppose that α⇒ β  ∼β ⇒ ∼α. Since RW holds for ⇒, by fact 10 we
get that α⇒ γ  (α ∧ β)⇒ γ, contrary to fact 23.
Fact 26: Not: if Γ, α PL β, then Γ  α⇒ β.
Proof. Suppose that CP holds for ⇒. Then by fact 13 we get that FA and TC
also hold for ⇒, contrary to facts 21 and 22.
Fact 27: > ⇒ α 2 β ⇒ α
Proof. Suppose that > ⇒ α  β ⇒ α. Since CON holds for ⇒, by fact 14 we
get that β  α⇒ β, contrary to fact 22.
Fact 28: ∼(α⇒ β) 2 β ⇒ α
Proof. Suppose that 0 < P (α) < 1, and posit β = ∼α. Then UP (∼(α⇒ β)) =
1 − VP (∼(α ⇒ β)) = 1 − (1 − VP (α ⇒ β)) = VP (α ⇒ β) = P (∼α|α) = 0,
whereas UP (β ⇒ α) = 1 − VP (β ⇒ α) = 1 − P (α|β) = 1 − P (α|∼α) = 1.
Therefore, UP (∼(α⇒ β)) < UP (β ⇒ α).
Fact 29: ∼(α⇒ β) 2 ∼α⇒ β
Proof. Suppose that P (α) > 0 and P (∼α∧∼γ) > 0, and posit β = ∼α∧γ. Then
UP (∼(α ⇒ β)) = 1 − VP (∼(α ⇒ β)) = 1 − (1 − VP (α ⇒ β)) = VP (α ⇒ β) =
P (β|α) = P (∼α∧γ|α) = 0, but UP (∼α⇒ β) = 1−VP (∼α⇒ β) = 1−P (∼α∧
γ|∼α) = 1− P (γ|∼α) > 0. Therefore, UP (∼(α⇒ β)) < UP (∼α⇒ β).
Fact 30: If β PL ∼γ, then ♦α, α⇒ β  ∼(α⇒ γ)
Proof. Assume that β PL ∼γ. Two cases must be considered.
Case 1 : P (α) = 0. In this case UP (♦α) = 1 − VP (♦α) = 1 − VP (∼∼α) =
1 − (1 − VP (∼α) = VP (∼α) = 1. Therefore, UP (♦α) + UP (α ⇒ β) ≥
UP (∼(α⇒ γ)).
Case 2 : P (α) > 0. In this case, since β PL ∼γ, we have that P (β|α)+P (γ|α) ≤
1, so that 1 − P (β|α) ≥ P (γ|α). Given that UP (α ⇒ β) = 1 − VP (α ⇒ β) =
1 − P (β|α), and that UP (∼(α ⇒ γ)) = 1 − VP (∼(α ⇒ γ)) = 1 − (1 − Vp(α ⇒
γ)) = 1 − (1 − P (γ|α)) = P (γ|α), we get that UP (α ⇒ β) ≥ UP (∼(α ⇒ γ)).
Therefore, UP (♦α) + UP (α⇒ β) ≥ UP (∼(α⇒ γ)).
Fact 31: ♦α, α⇒ β  ∼(α⇒ ∼β)
Proof. From facts 16 and 30.
Fact 32: ♦α  ∼(α⇒ ∼α)
Proof. From facts 17 and 31.
Fact 33: ♦∼β, α⇒ β 2 ∼(∼α⇒ β)
Proof. Suppose that P (β) > 0 and P (∼β) > 0, and posit α = β ∧ ∼β. Then
UP (♦∼β) +UP (α⇒ β) = UP (♦∼β) +UP ((β ∧∼β)⇒ β) = 1−VP (♦∼β) + 1−
VP ((β ∧∼β)⇒ β)) = 1−VP (∼β) + 1−VP (⊥ ⇒ β) = 1− (1−VP (β)) + 1−
VP (⊥ ⇒ β)) = 1−(1−0)+(1−1) = 0, and UP (∼(∼α⇒ β)) = 1−VP (∼(∼α⇒
β)) = 1−(1−VP (∼α⇒ β)) = 1−(1−VP (∼(β∧∼β)⇒ β)) = 1−(1−VP (∼⊥ ⇒
β)) = 1−(1−VP (> ⇒ β)) = 1−(1−P (β|>)) = P (β|>) = P (β) > 0. Therefore,
UP (♦∼β) + UP (α⇒ β) < UP (∼(∼α⇒ β)).
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Fact 34: If α PL β, then  α . β
Proof. Assume that α PL β. Two cases must be considered.
Case 1 : P (β) = 1. In this case, VP (α . β) = 1, so UP (α . β) = 0.
Case 2 : P (β) < 1. In this case, if P (α) = 0, then again VP (α . β) = 1, so
UP (α.β) = 0. If P (α) > 0, we have that P (β|α) = 1 because α PL β. It follows
that P (β|α)− P (β) = 1− P (β), so that VP (α . β) = 1 and UP (α . β) = 0.
Fact 35: α . β  α ⊃ β
Proof. Three cases must be considered.
Case 1 : P (α) = 0 or P (β) = 1. In this case VP (α ⊃ β) = 1, so UP (α ⊃ β) = 0.
Therefore, UP (α . β) ≥ UP (α ⊃ β).
Case 2 : P (α) > 0, P (β) < 1, and P (β|α) > P (β). In this case we have that
P (∼β|α)P (α)P (∼β) ≤ P (∼β|α)
P (β|α) + P (∼β|α)P (α)P (∼β) ≤ P (β|α) + P (∼β|α)
P (β|α) + P (∼β|α)P (α)P (∼β) ≤ P (β) + P (∼β)
P (β|α)− P (β) ≤ P (∼β)− P (∼β|α)P (α)P (∼β)
P (β|α)− P (β)
P (∼β)
≤ 1− P (∼β|α)P (α)
P (β|α)− P (β)
1− P (β)
≤ 1− P (α ∧ ∼β)
P (β|α)− P (β)
1− P (β)
≤ P (∼(α ∧ ∼β))
This means that VP (α . β) ≤ VP (α ⊃ β). Therefore, UP (α . β) ≥ UP (α ⊃ β).
Case 3 : P (α) > 0, P (β) < 1, and P (β|α) ≤ P (β). In this case VP (α . β) = 0,
so UP (α . β) = 1. Therefore, UP (α . β) ≥ UP (α ⊃ β).
Fact 36: > . α  α
Proof. From facts 4 and 35.
Fact 37: α . β, α  β
Proof. From facts 5 and 35.
Fact 38: α . β, α . γ  α . (β ∧ γ)
Proof. First, note that if P (α) = 0, then UP (α. (β∧γ)) = 1−VP (α. (β∧γ)) =
1 − 1 = 0, so UP (α . β) + UP (α . γ) ≥ UP (α . (β ∧ γ)). Second, note that if
P (β) = 1, then VP (α . γ) = VP (α . (β ∧ γ)), so UP (α . γ) = UP (α . (β ∧ γ)).
Therefore, UP (α.β)+UP (α.γ) ≥ UP (α.(β∧γ)). The same conclusion follows
if P (γ) = 1. Third, note that if P (β ∧ γ) = 1, then P (β) = 1 and P (γ) = 1, so
UP (α . β) + UP (α . γ) ≥ UP (α . (β ∧ γ)) for the reasons just explained. Now
let us reason under the assumption that P (α) > 0, P (β) < 1, and P (γ) < 1.
Three cases must be considered.
Case 1 : P (β|α) ≤ P (β) or P (γ|α) ≤ P (γ). In this case VP (α . β) = 0 or
VP (α . γ) = 0, and consequently UP (α . β) = 1 or UP (α . γ) = 1. Therefore,
UP (α . β) + UP (α . γ) ≥ UP (α . (β ∧ γ)).
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Case 2 : P (β|α) > P (β), P (γ|α) > P (γ), and P (β ∧ γ|α) > P (β ∧ γ). We know
that P (β∧∼γ)P (∼γ)P (∼β|α)+P (∼β∧γ)P (∼β)P (∼γ|α)+P (∼γ)P (∼β)P (∼β∧
∼γ|α) ≥ 0. Therefore, P (β ∧ ∼γ)(P (β ∧ ∼γ) + P (∼β ∧ ∼γ))(P (∼β ∧ γ|α) +
P (∼β ∧∼γ|α)) + P (∼β ∧ γ)(P (∼β ∧ γ) + P (∼β ∧∼γ)(P (β ∧∼γ|α) + P (∼β ∧
∼γ|α)+(P (β∧∼γ)+P (∼β∧∼γ))(P (∼β∧γ)+P (∼β∧∼γ))P (∼β∧∼γ|α) ≥ 0.
From this, by means of purely algebraic steps, we get what follows.33
P (∼β ∧ γ|α) + P (∼β ∧ ∼γ|α)
P (∼β ∧ γ) + P (∼β ∧ ∼γ)
+
P (β ∧ ∼γ|α) + P (∼β ∧ ∼γ|α)
P (β ∧ ∼γ) + P (∼β ∧ ∼γ)
≥ P (β ∧ ∼γ|α) + P (∼β ∧ γ|α) + P (∼β ∧ ∼γ|α)






≥ P (∼β ∨ ∼γ|α)






≥ P (∼(β ∧ γ)|α)






≥ 1− P (β ∧ γ|α)
P (∼(β ∧ γ))
P (∼β)− P (β|α) + 1− P (∼β)
P (∼β)
+
P (∼γ)− P (γ|α) + 1− P (∼γ)
P (∼γ)
≥ P (∼(β ∧ γ))− P (β ∧ γ|α) + 1− P (∼(β ∧ γ))
P (∼(β ∧ γ))
P (∼β)− P (β|α) + P (β)
P (∼β)
+
P (∼γ)− P (γ|α) + P (γ)
P (∼γ)
≥ P (∼(β ∧ γ))− P (β ∧ γ|α) + P (β ∧ γ)
P (∼(β ∧ γ))
1− P (β|α)− P (β)
P (∼β)
+ 1− P (γ|α)− P (γ)
P (∼γ)
≥ 1− P (β ∧ γ|α)− P (β ∧ γ)
P (∼(β ∧ γ))
This means that 1 − VP (α . β) + 1 − VP (α . γ) ≥ 1 − VP (α . (β ∧ γ)), so that
UP (α . β) + UP (α . γ) ≥ UP (α . (β ∧ γ)).
Case 3 : P (β|α) > P (β), P (γ|α) > P (γ), and P (β ∧ γ|α) ≤ P (β ∧ γ). In this
case we have that
P (β ∧ γ|α)− P (β ∧ γ)
P (∼(β ∧ γ))
≤ 0
33The steps needed to get from the last formula to the next are conveniently stated if we
let a = P (β ∧ ∼γ), b = P (β ∧ ∼γ|α), c = P (∼β ∧ γ), d = P (∼β ∧ γ|α), e = P (∼β ∧ ∼γ),
f = P (∼β ∧ ∼γ|α). That is,
a(a+ e)(d+ f) + c(c+ e)(b+ f) + (a+ e)(c+ e)f ≥ 0
a(a+ e)d+ a(a+ e)f + c(c+ e)b+ c(c+ e)f + a(c+ e)f + e(c+ e)f ≥ 0
a2d+ aed+ a2f + acf + aef + aef + cef + e2f + c2b+ ceb+ c2f + cef ≥ 0
a2d+ acd+ aed+ aed+ ced+ e2d+ a2f + acf + aef + aef + cef + e2f + acb+ c2b+ ceb+ aeb+ ceb+ e2b
+acf + c2f + cef + aef + cef + e2f ≥ acb+ ceb+ aeb+ e2b+ acd+ ced+ aed+ e2d+ acf + cef + aef + e2f










From this and the last line of the reasoning set out in case 2 we obtain that
1− P (β|α)− P (β)
P (∼β)
+ 1− P (γ|α)− P (γ)
P (∼γ)
≥ 1
This is to say that 1− VP (α . β) + 1− VP (α . γ) ≥ 1, hence that UP (α . β) +
UP (α . γ) ≥ 1. Therefore, UP (α . β) + UP (α . γ) ≥ UP (α . (β ∧ γ)).
Fact 39: α . β  ∼β .∼α
Proof. Three cases must be considered.
Case 1 : P (α) = 0 or P (β) = 1. In this case P (∼α) = 1 or P (∼β) = 0, so
VP (∼β . ∼α) = 1. It follows that UP (∼β . ∼α) = 0, hence that UP (α . β) ≥
UP (∼β .∼α).
Case 2 : P (α) > 0, P (β) < 1, and P (β|α) ≤ P (β). In this case VP (α . β) = 0,
so UP (α . β) = 1. Therefore, UP (α . β) ≥ UP (∼β .∼α).
Case 3 : P (α) > 0, P (β) < 1, and P (β|α) > P (β). In this case, by the
probability calculus we have that P (∼α|∼β) > P (∼α), so that
VP (α . β) =
P (β|α)− P (β)
1− P (β)
=
P (∼β)− P (∼β|α)
P (∼β)
= 1− P (∼β|α)
P (∼β)
VP (∼β .∼α) =
P (∼α|∼β)− P (∼α)
1− P (∼α)
=
P (α)− P (α|∼β)
P (α)





= 1− P (α|∼β)
P (α)
Therefore, VP (α . β) = VP (∼β . ∼α), and consequently UP (α . β) ≥ UP (∼β .
∼α).
Fact 40 α . γ, β . γ  (α ∨ β) . γ
Proof. From facts 11 and 39.
Fact 41: α  β . α
Proof. Two cases must be considered.
Case 1 : P (α) < 1. In this case VP (α) = 0, so UP (α) = 1. Therefore,
UP (α) ≥ UP (β . α).
Case 2 : P (α) = 1. In this case VP (β . α) = 1, so UP (β . α) = 0. Therefore,
UP (α) ≥ UP (β . α).
Fact 42: ∼α  α . β
Proof. From facts 15 and 41.
Fact 43: α . β, α . γ  (α ∧ β) . γ
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Proof. First, note that if P (α∧β) = 0 or P (γ) = 1, then VP ((α∧β).γ) = 1, so
UP ((α∧β).γ) = 0. Therefore, UP (α.β)+UP (α.γ) ≥ UP ((α∧β).γ). Second,
note that if P (β) = 1 or P (α ∧ ∼β) = 0, then VP (α . γ) = VP ((α ∧ β) . γ), so
UP (α.γ) = UP ((α∧β).γ). Therefore, UP (α.β)+UP (α.γ) ≥ UP ((α∧β).γ).
Now let us reason under the assumption that P (β) < 1, P (γ) < 1, P (α∧β) > 0,
P (α ∧ ∼β) > 0. Three cases are possible.
Case 1 : P (β|α) ≤ P (β) or P (γ|α) ≤ P (γ). In this case VP (α . β) = 0 or
VP (α . γ) = 0, which means that UP (α . β) = 1 or UP (α . γ) = 1. It follows
that UP (α . β) + UP (α . γ) ≥ UP ((α ∧ β) . γ).
Case 2 : P (β|α) > P (β) and P (γ|α) > P (γ), but P (γ|α ∧ β) ≤ P (γ). In this
case P (α ∧ β|γ) ≤ P (α ∧ β) ≤ P (α ∧ β|∼γ), and we have that
P (α ∧ ∼β|∼γ) + P (α|∼β) ≥ P (α|∼β)P (∼β)
P (α ∧ ∼β|∼γ) + P (α|∼β) ≥ P (α ∧ ∼β)
P (α ∧ β|∼γ) + P (α ∧ ∼β|∼γ) + P (α|∼β) ≥ P (α ∧ β) + P (α ∧ ∼β)
P (α|∼β)
P (α ∧ β) + P (α ∧ ∼β)
+
P (α ∧ β|∼γ) + P (α ∧ ∼β|∼γ)




















P (∼β) + P (β)− P (β|α)
P (∼β)
+




P (β)− P (β|α)
P (∼β)
+ 1 +
P (γ)− P (γ|α)
P (∼γ)
≥ 1
1− P (β|α)− P (β)
1− P (β)
+ 1− P (γ|α)− P (γ)
1− P (γ)
≥ 1
This means that 1 − VP (α . β) + 1 − VP (α . γ) ≥ 1, hence that UP (α . β) +
UP (α . γ) ≥ UP ((α ∧ β) . γ).
Case 3 : P (β|α) > P (β), P (γ|α) > P (γ), and P (γ|α ∧ β) > P (γ). In this case
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P (α ∧ β|γ) > P (α ∧ β) > P (α ∧ β|∼γ), and we have
P (α ∧ β) > P (α ∧ β|∼γ)
1 >
P (α ∧ β|∼γ)
P (α ∧ β)
P (α ∧ ∼β|∼γ)
P (α ∧ ∼β)
+ 1 >
P (α ∧ β|∼γ)
P (α ∧ β)
P (α ∧ ∼β)
P (∼β)P (α ∧ ∼β)
+
P (α ∧ ∼β|∼γ)
P (α ∧ ∼β)
>
P (α ∧ β|∼γ)
P (α ∧ β)
P (α|∼β)
P (α ∧ ∼β)
+
P (α ∧ ∼β|∼γ)
P (α ∧ ∼β)
>
P (α ∧ β|∼γ)
P (α ∧ β)
P (α|∼β)P (α ∧ β) + P (α ∧ ∼β|∼γ)P (α ∧ β) > P (α ∧ β|∼γ)P (α ∧ ∼β)
P (α|∼β)P (α ∧ β) + P (α ∧ β|∼γ)P (α ∧ β) + P (α ∧ ∼β|∼γ)P (α ∧ β)
> P (α ∧ β|∼γ)P (α ∧ β) + P (α ∧ β|∼γ)P (α ∧ ∼β)
P (α|∼β)P (α ∧ β) + P (α ∧ β)(P (α ∧ β|∼γ) + P (α ∧ ∼β|∼γ)) > P (α ∧ β|∼γ)(P (α ∧ β) + P (α ∧ ∼β))
P (α|∼β)
P (α ∧ β) + P (α ∧ ∼β)
+
P (α ∧ β|∼γ) + P (α ∧ ∼β|∼γ)
P (α ∧ β) + P (α ∧ ∼β)
>
P (α ∧ β|∼γ)







P (α ∧ β|∼γ)















1− P (γ|α ∧ β)
P (∼γ)
P (∼β) + P (β)− P (β|α)
P (∼β)
+
P (∼γ) + P (γ)− P (γ|α)
P (∼γ)
>
P (∼γ) + P (γ)− P (γ|α ∧ β)
P (∼γ)
1 +
P (β)− P (β|α)
P (∼β)
+ 1 +
P (γ)− P (γ|α)
P (∼γ)
> 1 +
P (γ)− P (γ|α ∧ β)
P (∼γ)
1− P (β|α)− P (β)
1− P (β)
+ 1− P (γ|α)− P (γ)
1− P (γ)
> 1− P (γ|α ∧ β)− P (γ)
1− P (γ)
This means that 1−VP (α.β) + 1−VP (α.γ) > 1−VP ((α∧β) . γ). Therefore,
UP (α . β) + UP (α . γ) ≥ UP ((α ∧ β) . γ.
Fact 44: α . γ,∼((α ∧ ∼β) . γ)  (α ∧ β) . γ
Proof. First, note that if P (α∧β) = 0, then VP ((α∧β).γ) = 1, hence UP ((α∧
β) . γ) = 0. Therefore, UP (α . γ) + UP (∼((α ∧ ∼β) . γ)) ≥ UP ((α ∧ β) . γ).
Second, note that if P (α∧∼β) = 0, then UP (∼((α∧∼β) . γ)) = 1−VP (∼((α∧
∼β) . γ)) = 1 − (1 − (VP ((α ∧ ∼β) . γ))) = 1 − (1 − 1) = 1. Therefore,
UP (α.γ)+UP (∼((α∧∼β).γ)) ≥ UP ((α∧β).γ). Now let us reason under the
assumption that P (α ∧ β) > 0 and P (α ∧ ∼β) > 0. Three cases are possible.
Case 1 : P (γ) = 1. In this case VP ((α ∧ β) . γ) = 1, so UP ((α ∧ β) . γ) = 0.
Therefore, UP (α . γ) + UP (∼((α ∧ ∼β) . γ)) ≥ UP ((α ∧ β) . γ).
Case 2 : P (γ) < 1 and P (γ|α) ≤ P (γ). In this case VP (α.γ) = 0, so UP (α.γ) =
1. Therefore, UP (α . γ) + UP (∼((α ∧ ∼β) . γ)) ≥ UP ((α ∧ β) . γ).
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Case 3 : P (γ) < 1 and P (γ|α) > P (γ). In this case we can assume that
P (γ|α ∧ β) ≥ P (γ|α) ≥ P (γ|α ∧ ∼β) with no loss of generality, and we have:
P (γ|α ∧ β) ≥ P (γ|α)
P (γ|α ∧ β)− P (γ) ≥ P (γ|α)− P (γ)
P (γ|α ∧ β)− P (γ)
P (∼γ)
≥ P (γ|α)− P (γ)
P (∼γ)
1− P (γ|α ∧ β)− P (γ)
P (∼γ)
≤ 1− P (γ|α)− P (γ)
P (∼γ)
1− P (γ|α ∧ β)− P (γ)
1− P (γ)
≤ 1− P (γ|α)− P (γ)
1− P (γ)
1− VP ((α ∧ β) . γ) ≤ 1− VP (α . γ)
VP (∼((α ∧ β) . γ)) ≤ VP (∼(α . γ))
1− VP (∼((α ∧ β) . γ)) ≥ 1− VP (∼(α . γ))
UP (∼((α ∧ β) . γ)) ≥ UP (∼(α . γ))
UP (∼((α ∧ β) . γ)) + UP (∼((α ∧ ∼β) . γ)) ≥ UP (∼(α . γ))
1 + UP (∼((α ∧ β) . γ)) + UP (∼((α ∧ ∼β) . γ)) ≥ 1 + UP (∼(α . γ))
1− UP (∼(α . γ)) + UP (∼((α ∧ ∼β) . γ)) ≥ 1− UP (∼((α ∧ β) . γ))
1− (1− VP (∼(α . γ))) + UP (∼((α ∧ ∼β) . γ)) ≥ 1− (1− VP (∼((α ∧ β) . γ)))
1− VP (∼∼(α . γ)) + UP (∼((α ∧ ∼β) . γ)) ≥ 1− VP (∼∼((α ∧ β) . γ))
1− VP (α . γ) + UP (∼((α ∧ ∼β) . γ)) ≥ 1− VP ((α ∧ β) . γ)
This means that UP (α . γ) + UP (∼((α ∧ ∼β) . γ)) ≥ UP ((α ∧ β) . γ).
Fact 45: α . γ,∼(α .∼β) 2 (α ∧ β) . γ
Proof. Let us assume the distribution of probability listed in section 6. Then
P (α) = P (γ) = 0, 30, and P (β) = 0, 23. Moreover, P (γ|α) = 0, 56, P (γ|α∧β) =
0, 25, and P (β|α) = P (β) = 0, 23. In this case, we have
UP (α.γ) = 1−VP (α.γ) = 1−
P (γ|α)− P (γ)
1− P (γ)
= 1−0, 56− 0, 30
1− 0, 30
= 1−0, 38 = 0, 62
UP (∼(α .∼β)) = 1− VP (∼(α .∼β)) = 1− (1− VP (α .∼β)) = 1− (1− 0) = 0
UP ((α ∧ β) . γ) = 1− VP ((α ∧ β) . γ) = 1− 0 = 1
Therefore, UP (α . γ) + UP (∼(α .∼β) < UP ((α ∧ β) . γ).
Fact 46: α . γ 2 (α ∧ β) . γ
Proof. Suppose that α . γ  (α ∧ β) . γ. Then, α . γ,∼(α . ∼β)  (α ∧ β) . γ,
contrary to fact 45.
Fact 47: Not: if β PL γ, then α . β  α . γ
Proof. Suppose that, if β PL γ, then α . β  α . γ. Then, by facts 10 and 39
we get that α . γ  (α ∧ β) . γ, contrary to fact 46.
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Fact 48: α . β, β . γ 2 α . γ
Proof. Suppose that α . β, β . γ  α . γ. Then, by facts 9 and 34 we get that
α . β  (α ∧ β) . γ, contrary to fact 46.
Fact 49: α . β, (α ∧ β) . γ 2 α . γ
Proof. Suppose that α . β, (α ∧ β) . γ  α . γ. Then, by facts 6 and 34 we get
that, if β PL γ, then α . β  α . γ, contrary to fact 47.
Fact 50: α . β, β . α, β . γ 2 α . γ
Proof. Suppose that α . β, β . α, β . γ  α . γ. Then, by facts 12, 34, and 38 we
get that α . β, (α ∧ β) . γ  α . γ, contrary to fact 49.
Fact 51: α ∧ β 2 α . β
Proof. Suppose that P (α ∧ β) > 0, and that α and β are probabilistically
independent, so that P (α∧β) = P (α)P (β). Then UP (α∧β) = 1−VP (α∧β) =
1 − P (α ∧ β) < 1. However, UP (α . β) = 1 − VP (α . β) = 1 − 0 = 1, because
P (β|α) = P (β). Therefore, UP (α ∧ β) < UP (α . β).
Fact 52: ∼(α . β) 2 α .∼β
Proof. Suppose that ∼(α . β)  α . ∼β. Then, by facts 8 and 43 we get that
α . γ,∼(α .∼β)  (α ∧ β) . γ, contrary to fact 45.
Fact 53: ∼α 2 α . β
Proof. Suppose that 0 < P (β) < 1, and posit α = ∼β. Then UP (∼α) = 1 −
VP (∼α) = 1−P (∼α) = 1−P (β) < 1. But UP (α.β) = 1−VP (α.β) = 1−0 = 1,
because P (β|α) = P (β|∼β) = 0. Therefore, UP (∼α) < UP (α . β).
Fact 54: β 2 α . β
Proof. Suppose that 0 < P (α) < 1, and posit β = ∼α. Then UP (β) = 1 −
VP (β) = 1− P (∼α) < 1. But UP (α . β) = 1− VP (α . β) = 1− 0 = 1, because
P (β|α) = P (∼α|α) = 0. Therefore, UP (β) < UP (α . β).
Fact 55: Not: if Γ, α PL β, then Γ  α . β
Proof. Like that of fact 26.
Fact 56: ∼(α . β) 2 β . α
Proof. Suppose that 0 < P (α) < 1, and posit β = ∼α. Then UP (∼(α . β)) =
1 − VP (∼(α . β)) = 1 − (1 − VP (α . β)) = 1 − (1 − 0) = 0, because P (β|α) =
P (∼α|α) = 0. But UP (β . α) = 1 − VP (β . α) = 1 − 0 = 1, because P (α|β) =
P (α|∼α) = 0. Therefore, UP (∼(α . β)) < UP (β . α).
Fact 57: ∼(α . β) 2 ∼α . β
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Proof. Suppose that P (α) > 0 and that P (∼α∧∼γ) > 0, and posit β = ∼α∧γ.
Then UP (∼(α . β)) = 1−VP (∼(α . β)) = 1− (1−VP (α . β)) = 1− (1− 0) = 0,
because P (β|α) = P (∼α ∧ γ|α) = 0. But UP (∼α . β) = 1 − VP (∼α . β) > 0,
because we have
P (β|∼α) = P (∼α ∧ γ|∼α) = P (∼α ∧ γ)
P (∼α)
=
P (∼α ∧ γ)
P (∼α ∧ γ) + P (∼α ∧ ∼γ)
< 1
Therefore, UP (∼(α . β)) < UP (∼α . β).
Fact 58: > . α  β . α
Proof. Let α, β ∈ P, and consider any probability function P . Two cases are
possible.
Case 1 : P (α) < 1. In this case P (α|>) = P (α), and UP (>.α) = 1−VP (>.α) =
1− 0 = 1. Therefore, UP (> . α) ≥ UP (β . α).
Case 2 : P (α) = 1. In this case, UP (> . α) = 1 − 1 = 0, and UP (β . α) =
1− VP (β . α) = 1− 1 = 0. Therefore, UP (> . α) ≥ UP (β . α).
Fact 59: α 2 > . α
Proof. Suppose that α  > . α. Then, by facts 14 and 58 we get that β  α . β,
contrary to fact 54.
Fact 60: If β PL ∼γ, then ♦α, α . β  ∼(α . γ)
Proof. Assume that β PL ∼γ. First, note that if P (α) = 0, then VP (♦α) = 0,
so UP (♦α) = 1. Therefore, UP (♦α) + UP (α . β) ≥ UP (∼(α . γ)). Second,
note that if P (β) = 1, then P (∼γ) = 1, because β PL ∼γ, so P (γ) = 0 and
VP (α.γ) = 0, which means that VP (∼(α.γ)) = 1, hence that UP (∼(α.γ)) = 0.
Therefore, UP (♦α) + UP (α . β) ≥ UP (∼(α . γ)). Third, note that if P (γ) = 1,
then P (∼β) = 1, because β PL ∼γ, so P (β) = 0. It follows that VP (α.β) = 0,
hence that UP (α.β) = 1. Therefore, UP (♦α)+UP (α.β) ≥ UP (∼(α.γ)). Now
let us reason under the assumption that P (α) > 0, P (β) < 1, and P (γ) < 1.
Three cases are possible.
Case 1 : P (β|α) ≤ P (β). In this case VP (α.β) = 0, so UP (α.β) = 1. Therefore,
UP (♦α) + UP (α . β) ≥ UP (∼(α . γ)).
Case 2 : P (γ|α) ≤ P (γ). In this case VP (α . γ) = 0, so VP (∼(α . γ)) = 1 and
UP (∼(α . γ)) = 0. Therefore, UP (♦α) + UP (α . β) ≥ UP (∼(α . γ)).
Case 3 : P (β|α) > P (β) and P (γ|α) > P (γ). In this case, since β PL ∼γ, we
have that 1 ≥ P (β ∨ γ|α) = P (β|α) + P (γ|α). Moreover, P (β|α) ≥ VP (α . β),
because
P (β)(1− P (β|α)) ≥ 0
P (β)− P (β)P (β|α) ≥ 0
P (β) + (−P (β))P (β|α) ≥ 0
P (β) + (−(1− P (∼β)))P (β|α) ≥ 0
P (β) + (P (∼β)− 1)P (β|α) ≥ 0
P (β|α)P (∼β)− P (β|α) + P (β) ≥ 0
P (β|α)P (∼β) ≥ P (β|α)− P (β)
P (β|α) ≥ P (β|α)− P (β)
P (∼β)
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For the same reasons, P (γ|α) ≥ VP (α . γ). Thus, given that 1 ≥ P (β ∨ γ|α) =
P (β|α) + P (γ|α), we have that
1 ≥ VP (α . β) + VP (α . γ)
1− VP (α . β) ≥ VP (α . γ)
1− VP (α . β) ≥ 1− (1− VP (α . γ))
1− VP (α . β) ≥ 1− (VP (∼(α . γ))
UP (α . β) ≥ UP (∼(α . γ))
This entails that UP (♦α) + UP (α . β) ≥ UP (∼(α . γ)).
Fact 61: ♦α, α . β  ∼(α .∼β)
Proof. From facts 16 and 60.
Fact 62: ♦α  ∼(α .∼α)
Proof. From facts 17, 34, and 61.
Fact 63: ♦∼β, α . β  ∼(∼α . β)
Proof. From facts 18, 39, and 60.
Fact 64: If α PL β, then  α J β
Proof. Assume that α PL β. Then VP (α J β) = 1 no matter whether P (α) > 0
or P (α) = 0, so UP (α J β) = 1− VP (α J β) = 1− 1 = 0.
Fact 65: α J β  α ⊃ β
Proof. Two cases must be considered.
Case 1 : P (β|α) = 1. In this case VP (α ⊃ β) = 1, because we have that
P (∼β|α)P (α) ≤ P (∼β|α)
P (β|α) + P (∼β|α)P (α) ≤ P (β|α) + P (∼β|α)
P (β|α) + P (∼β|α)P (α) ≤ 1
P (β|α) ≤ 1− P (∼β|α)P (α)
P (β|α) ≤ 1− P (α ∧ ∼β)
P (β|α) ≤ 1− P (∼(α ⊃ β))
P (β|α) ≤ P (α ⊃ β)
This entails that UP (α ⊃ β) = 0. Therefore, UP (α J β) ≥ UP (α ⊃ β).
Case 2 : P (β|α) < 1. In this case VP (α J β) = 0, so UP (α J β) = 1. Therefore,
UP (α J β) ≥ UP (α ⊃ β).
Fact 66: > . α  α
Proof. From facts 4 and 65.
Fact 67: α . β, α  β
Proof. From facts 5 and 65.
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Fact 68: α J β, α J γ  α J (β ∧ γ)
Proof. First, note that if P (α) = 0, then VP (α J (β ∧ γ)) = 1, so UP (α J
(β ∧ γ)) = 0. Therefore, UP (α J β) + UP (α J γ) ≥ UP (α J (β ∧ γ)). Now we
will reason under the assumption that P (α) > 0. Two cases must be considered.
Case 1 : P (β|α) < 1 or P (γ|α) < 1. In this case VP (α J β) = 0 or VP (α J
γ) = 0, which means that UP (α J β) = 1 or UP (α J γ) = 1. Therefore,
UP (α J β) + UP (α J γ) ≥ UP (α J (β ∧ γ)).
Case 2 : P (β|α) = 1 and P (γ|α) = 1. In this case P (α ∧ β) = P (α). Since
P (α) = P (α∧β)+P (α∧∼β), then P (α∧∼β) = 0. Moreover, since P (α∧∼β) =
P (γ∧∼β∧α)+P (∼γ∧∼β∧α), it follows that P (γ∧∼β∧α) = P (∼γ∧∼β∧α) =
0. A similar reasoning leads from the premise that P (α ∧ γ) = P (α) to the
conclusion that P (β ∧∼γ ∧ α) = P (∼β ∧∼γ ∧ α) = 0. Consequently, P (∼(β ∧
γ)∧α) = P ((∼β∨∼γ)∧α)) = P (∼β∧∼γ∧α)+P (β∧∼γ∧α)+P (∼β∧γ∧α) = 0,
so that P (α) = P ((β∧γ)∧α))+P (∼(β∧γ)∧α) = P ((β∧γ)∧α), which implies
that P (β ∧ γ|α) = 1. Thus, VP (α J (β ∧ γ)) = 1, hence UP (α J (β ∧ γ)) = 0.
Therefore, UP (α J β) + UP (α J γ) ≥ UP (α J (β ∧ γ)).
Fact 69: α J β  ∼β J ∼α
Proof. Three cases must be considered.
Case 1 : P (α) = 0 or P (β) = 1. In this case P (∼α) = 1 or P (∼β) = 0, so
VP (∼β J ∼α) = 1 and UP (∼β J ∼α) = 0. Therefore, UP (α J β) ≥ UP (∼β J
∼α).
Case 2 : P (α) > 0, P (β) < 1, and P (β|α) < 1. In this case VP (α J β) = 0, so
UP (α J β) = 1. Therefore, UP (α J β) ≥ UP (∼β J ∼α).
Case 3 : P (α) > 0, P (β) < 1, and P (β|α) = 1. In this case P (α ∧ β) = P (α).
Since P (α) = P (α ∧ β) + P (α ∧ ∼β), we get that P (α ∧ ∼β) = 0, hence that
P (α|∼β) = 0. It follows that P (∼α|∼β) = 1, so that VP (∼β J ∼α) = 1, which
means that UP (∼β J ∼α) = 0. Therefore, UP (α J β) ≥ UP (∼β J ∼α).
Fact 70: α J γ, β J γ  (α ∨ β) J γ
Proof. From facts 11 and 69.
Fact 71: α  β J α
Proof. Two cases must be considered.
Case 1 : P (α) < 1. In this case VP (α) = 0, hence UP (α) = 1. Therefore,
UP (α) ≥ UP (α J β).
Case 2 : P (α) = 1. In this case, if P (β) = 0, then VP (β J α) = 1, and if P (β) >
0, then P (α|β) = 1, given that P (α ∧ β) = P (β), so again VP (β J α) = 1. It
follows that UP (β J α) = 0, hence that UP (α) ≥ UP (α J β).
Fact 72: ∼α  α . β
Proof. From facts 15 and 71.
Fact 73: α J β, β J γ  α J γ
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Proof. First, note that if P (α) = 0, then VP (α J γ) = 1, hence UP (α J γ) = 0.
Therefore, UP (α J β) + UP (β J γ) ≥ UP (α J γ). Second, note that the same
holds if P (α) > 0 but P (β) = 0, because VP (α J β) = 0, hence UP (α J β) = 1.
Now let us reason under the assumption that P (α) > 0 and P (β) > 0. Two
cases are possible.
Case 1 : P (β|α) < 1 or P (γ|β) < 1. In this case VP (α J β) = 0 or VP (β J γ) =
0, hence UP (α J β) = 1 or UP (β J γ) = 1. Therefore, UP (α J β) + UP (β J
γ) ≥ UP (α J γ).
Case 2 : P (β|α) = 1 and P (γ|β) = 1. In this case we have that P (α ∧ β) =
P (α). Since P (α) = P (α ∧ β) + P (α ∧ ∼β), it follows that P (α ∧ ∼β) = 0.
Moreover, since P (α ∧ ∼β) = P (γ ∧ ∼β ∧ α) + P (∼γ ∧ ∼β ∧ α), it follows
that P (∼γ ∧ ∼β ∧ α) = 0. A similar reasoning leads from the premise that
P (β ∧ γ) = P (β) to the conclusion that P (β ∧∼γ ∧ α) = 0. Thus we have that
P (∼γ∧α) = P (∼γ∧β∧α)+P (∼γ∧∼β∧α) = 0. So P (α) = P (α∧γ)+P (α∧
∼γ) = P (α ∧ γ), which entails that P (γ|α) = 1. It follows that VP (α J γ) = 1,
so that UP (α J γ) = 0. Therefore, UP (α J β) + UP (β J γ) ≥ UP (α J γ).
Fact 74: α J γ  (α ∧ β) J γ
Proof. From facts 9, 64, and 73.
Fact 75: α J β, β J α, β J γ  α J γ
Proof. Directly from fact 73.
Fact 76: α J β, (α ∧ β) J γ  α J γ
Proof. From facts 12, 64, 68, and 75.
Fact 77: If β PL γ, then α J β  α J γ
Proof. From facts 6, 64, and 76.
Fact 78: α J γ,∼(α J ∼β)  (α ∧ β) J γ
Proof. Directly from fact 74.
Fact 79: α J β, α J γ  (α ∧ β) J γ
Proof. Directly from fact 74.
Fact 80: α J γ,∼((α ∧ ∼β) J γ)  (α ∧ β) J γ
Proof. Directly from fact 74.
Fact 81: > J α  β J α
Proof. Directly from fact 74, given that β is equivalent to > ∧ β.
Fact 82: ∼α 2 α J β
Proof. Suppose that 0 < P (β) < 1, and posit α = ∼β. Then UP (∼α) =
1 − VP (∼α) = 1 − P (∼α) < 1. But UP (α J β) = 1 − VP (α J β) = 1, because
P (β|α) = P (β|∼β) = 0. Therefore, UP (∼α) < UP (α J β).
Fact 83: β 2 α J β
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Proof. Suppose that 0 < P (α) < 1, and posit β = ∼α. Then UP (β) = 1 −
VP (β) = 1 − P (∼α) < 1. But UP (α J β) = 1 − VP (α J β) = 1, because
P (β|α) = P (∼α|α) = 0. Therefore, UP (β) < UP (α J β).
Fact 84: α 2 > J α
Proof. From facts 14, 81, and 83.
Fact 85: α ∧ β 2 α J β
Proof. Suppose that P (α ∧ β) > 0 and P (α ∧ ∼β) > 0. Then UP (α ∧ β) =
1 − VP (α ∧ β) = 1 − P (α ∧ β) < 1, because P (α ∧ β) > 0. But UP (α J
β) = 1 − VP (α J β) = 1, because P (α ∧ ∼β) > 0, thus P (α ∧ β) < P (α) and
P (β|α) < 1. Therefore, UP (α ∧ β) < UP (α J β).
Fact 86: ∼(α J β) 2 α J ∼β
Proof. Suppose that P (α ∧ β) > 0 and P (α ∧ ∼β) > 0. Then UP (∼(α J
β)) = 1 − VP (∼(α J β)) = 1 − (1 − VP (α J β)) = 1 − (1 − 0) = 0, because
P (α∧∼β) > 0, so P (α∧β) < P (α) and consequently P (β|α) < 1. But UP (α J
∼β) = 1−VP (α J ∼β) = 1−0 = 1, because P (α∧β) > 0, so P (α∧∼β) < P (α)
and consequently P (∼β|α) < 1. Therefore, UP (∼(α J β)) < UP (α J ∼β).
Fact 87: Not: if Γ, α PL β, then Γ  α J β
Proof. Like that of facts 26 and 55.
Fact 88: ∼(α J β) 2 β J α
Proof. Suppose that 0 < P (α) < 1, and posit β = ∼α. Then UP (∼(α J
β)) = 1 − VP (∼(α J β)) = 1 − (1 − VP (α J β)) = 1 − (1 − 0) = 0, because
P (β|α) = P (∼α|α) = 0. But UP (β J α) = 1− VP (β J α) = 1− 0 = 1, because
P (α|β) = P (α|∼α) = 0. Therefore, UP (∼(α J β)) < UP (β J α).
Fact 89: ∼(α J β) 2 ∼α J β
Proof. Suppose that P (α) > 0 and P (∼α∧∼γ) > 0, and posit β = ∼α∧γ. Then
UP (∼(α J β)) = 1 − VP (∼(α J β)) = 1 − (1 − VP (α J β)) = 1 − (1 − 0) = 0,
because P (β|α) = P (∼α ∧ γ|α) = 0. But UP (∼α J β) = 1 − VP (∼α J β) =
1− 0 = 1, because P (β|∼α) = P (∼α ∧ γ|∼α) = P (γ|∼α), and
P (γ|∼α) = P (∼α ∧ γ)
P (∼α)
=
P (∼α ∧ γ)
P (∼α ∧ γ) + P (∼α ∧ ∼γ)
< 1
Therefore, UP (∼(α J β)) < UP (∼α J β).
Fact 90: If β PL ∼γ, then ♦α, α J β  ∼(α J γ)
Proof. Two cases must be considered.
Case 1 : P (α) = 0. In this case VP (♦α) = 0, which entails that UP (♦α) = 1.
Therefore, UP (♦α) + UP (α J β) ≥ UP (∼(α J γ)).
Case 2 : P (α) > 0. In this case, since β PL ∼γ, we have that 1 ≥ P (β∨γ|α) =
P (β|α) + P (γ|α). It follows that either VP (α J β) = 1 and VP (α J γ) = 0,
with the consequence that UP (α J β) = 1 − VP (α J β) = 0 and UP (∼(α J
γ)) = 1 − VP (∼(α J γ)) = 1 − (1 − VP (α J γ)) = 0, or VP (α J β) = 0 and
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VP (α J γ) = 1, with the consequence that UP (α J β) = 1 − VP (α J β) = 1
and UP (∼(α J γ)) = 1 − VP (∼(α J γ)) = 1 − (1 − VP (α J γ)) = 1. In both
cases, UP (♦α) + UP (α J β) ≥ UP (∼(α J γ)).
Fact 91: ♦α, α J β  ∼(α J ∼β)
Proof. From facts 16 and 90.
Fact 92: ♦α  ∼(α J ∼α)
Proof. From facts 17, 64, and 91.
Fact 93: ♦∼β, α J β  ∼(∼α J β)
Proof. From facts 18, 69, and 90.
Fact 94: α J β  (α ⊃ β)
Proof. In order to prove that α J β  (α ⊃ β), three cases must be considered.
Case 1 : P (α) = 0 or P (β) = 1. In this case P (α ⊃ β) = 1, so VP ((α ⊃ β)) = 1
and UP ((α ⊃ β)) = 0. Therefore, UP (α J β) ≥ UP ((α ⊃ β)).
Case 2 : P (α) > 0, P (β) < 1, and P (β|α) = 1. Since P (β|α) ≤ P (α ⊃ β),
as has been shown in the proof of fact 65, in this case P (α ⊃ β) = 1, hence
VP ((α ⊃ β)) = 1 and UP ((α ⊃ β)) = 0. Therefore, UP (α J β) ≥ UP ((α ⊃
β).
Case 3 : P (α) > 0, P (β) < 1, and P (β|α) < 1, In this case VP (α J β) = 0 and
UP (α J β) = 1, so UP (α J β) ≥ UP ((α ⊃ β).
In order to prove that (α ⊃ β)  α J β, it suffices to note what follows. In
cases 1 and 2, VP (α J β) = 1 and UP (α J β) = 0. In case 3, P (α ⊃ β) < 1,




P (β|α) + P (∼β|α)P (α)
P (α)
= P (β|α) + P (∼β|α)
P (β|α) + P (∼β|α)P (α)
P (α)
= 1
P (β|α) = 1− P (∼β|α)P (α)
P (α)
P (β|α) = 1− P (α ∧ ∼β)
P (α)
P (β|α)P (α) = P (α)− P (α ∧ ∼β)
P (β|α)P (α) + P (∼α) = P (α) + P (∼α)− P (α ∧ ∼β)
P (β|α)P (α) + P (∼α) = 1− P (α ∧ ∼β)
P (β|α)P (α) + P (∼α) = P (∼α ∨ β)
P (β|α)P (α) + P (∼α) = P (α ⊃ β)
It follows that VP ((α ⊃ β)) = 0, hence that UP ((α ⊃ β)) = 1. Therefore,
UP ((α ⊃ β)) ≥ UP (α J β).
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